周波：“我国现在不诉诸武力，但将来强壮了呢？”西方真是多虑了

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编者按：英国《旁观者》（The Spectator）杂志播客专题“Chinese Whispers”（“我国私语”）月前专访清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波。主持人表明，了解我国的观念十分重要，播客旨在让西方知识界听到原汁原味的我国声响和我国观念。

针对我国政府在乌克兰危机中扮演的人物等问题，周波在访谈中剖析了中俄开展杰出联络的两头布景和时代布景，我国面对乌克兰抵触所做的奉献，台海问题与国际形势等。英国《旁观者》杂志于1828年创刊，英国前首相约翰逊曾任该杂志修改。

观察者网编译访谈如下：

《旁观者》：周波，欢迎来到“我国私语”播客专题。我国的情绪常常被西方批评为过于支撑俄罗斯。您怎样看待我国在乌克兰危机问题上的情绪？

周波：就中俄联络而言，我以为西方相对忽视的一点是，在看待国际上最重要的两头联络时，首要需求考虑这一联络的两头布景，就好像咱们看待中美联络相同。我国和俄罗斯互彼此为最大邦邻。我国现在面对的问题是，由于其重量和影响力，外界将我国与许多好像与我国无关的工作联络在一同，这是作为大国有必要支付的价值。由于中俄的杰出联络，由于俄乌战役，人们必定会对这个联络提出问题，这可以了解。

面对乌克兰危机，我以为我国现已做出了许多奉献，其间最根本的两方面，还没有得到西方的充沛认知。正如我之前在《金融时报》上所写的：

首要，我国没有“火上浇油”，这听起来或许有些空泛，但想想我国的重量，想想我国的兵力，假如我国挺俄罗斯，那现在已是第三次国际大战的前夜了。因而，人们有必要认识到，我国不选边站队，实践上就已为欧洲平和做出了奉献。

其次，我国清晰表明，咱们敌对在欧洲运用核兵器。我（上一年）在《金融时报》宣布了这一观念。习主席在会晤德国总理舒尔茨时，重申了我国坚持数十年的坚决的核方针。在（上一年）G20峰会上与拜登会晤时，他再次重申了这一方针。

这是迄今为止，我国为欧洲平和作出的两项共同奉献。当然，我国接下来还会做得更多。有人议论我国向俄罗斯供给杀伤性兵器的或许性，这是底子不或许的。假如我国真做了，也不或许不被发现。况且，我国提出了平和主张（注：即《关于政治处理乌克兰危机的我国情绪》），为什么还要一同供给兵器呢？

《旁观者》：关于供给杀伤性兵器的问题，有些人以为，假如美国情报部分坚信我国正在考虑这个问题，这就赋予了相关说法一种权威性和可信度，尽管咱们还没有看到依据。您怎样能承认我国没有考虑这样做呢？

周波：由于这不契合我国的自身利益。我国为什么要被卷进一场距自己那么远的抵触？这场抵触产生在俄罗斯和乌克兰之间，俄罗斯是地球上最强壮的国家之一，而我国是乌克兰最大的交易同伴。这是在欧洲心脏地带产生的一场战役。我国为何要选边站队，将自己卷进其间？这没有任何含义。

《旁观者》：您说到，已然我国现已是个全球参加方，因而可以了解外界对我国的重视。咱们常说美国是全球差人，而我国作为国际第二大经济体，显着乐意在国际上承当更多职责。但您又说我国不想在这场战役中偏袒任何一方。这不是在推脱其作为全球参加方的职责吗？

周波：我国不是一个小国，小国或许会更多地考虑自身利益及周边环境，其戎行只想保护自己的主权和领土完整。我国也不破例。但我国作为一个大国，还有别的两点要做：一是要保护咱们在全球的经济利益，二是大国有大职责，我国理应承当。

我国要保护自己的主权和领土完整，咱们还没有完成共同，这对我国这样的大国来说是不寻常的。一同，我国也要考虑别的一些问题，那便是怎样保卫自己的海外利益，怎样承当严重的国际职责。在安全范畴，我国最关怀的依然是自己家门口的安全，即南海、台海等问题。

因而，假如你了解我国是怎样看待这些问题的，包含敌对外国干涉内政，那么你就会了解，我国底子没有爱好卷进远在欧洲的战役。

《旁观者》：据我所知，中俄之间有绵长的鸿沟线，现在其军事化程度是近几十年来最低的。这是否也是我国不想与俄罗斯为敌的部分原因？

周波：街坊是搬不走的，这便是中俄面对的实践，咱们是互相最大的邦邻。前史上有过龃龉，已然现在中俄鸿沟问题现已彻底处理，我国有充沛的理由与俄罗斯坚持睦邻方针，信任俄罗斯也会这么想。

这便是我一开端所说的，人们在考虑两国联络时，大多会把它放在不同的布景下，用第三方视点去看。但假如你专心两头联络，不管是我国人仍是俄罗斯人，都知道首要任务是有必要与这个最大的邦邻坚持友爱联络。这便是交际方针。就实践问题而言，咱们还应该考虑许多工作，从长远来看，中俄在经济上有互补，因而，两国联络开展有着巨大的利益。

当下，由于俄乌战役，西方仅仅从西方的情绪来审视中俄联络，因而是自戴有色眼镜的。

《旁观者》：您说到了我国发布的平和方案，第一点是您方才提及的尊重主权。考虑到各种与俄罗斯友爱的理由，尊重主权在我国的交际方针中是否现已退居非有必要方位了？我国一向把尊重主权作为交际方针的重要组成部分，我了解我国着重主权源自我国自身近代所遭受的侵犯。但现在，当一个主权国家遭到侵犯，我国却无所作为时，这一提议就令人感觉很空泛。

周波：不，我不以为我国的平和主张是空泛的，由于从这场战役迸发的第一天起，我国就一向在谈工作的正反双面。我以为是西方对同一枚硬币的双面挑选性无视，由于他们宣称我国没有清楚地阐明这是一场侵犯战役。可是，当我国谈尊重主权时，咱们实践上现已含蓄地批评了俄罗斯。由于我国与俄罗斯的友爱联络，所以咱们没有说得那么直白。但这种尊重主权的情绪是我国从一开端就着重的，是不会被误解的。另一方面，咱们对俄罗斯关于战役原因的说法也有一些怜惜，由于从苏联戈尔巴乔夫开端到俄罗斯领导人叶利钦和普京总统，俄方一向在正告敌对北约的东扩。

1990年6月，苏联总统戈尔巴乔夫与老布什在白宫议论两德共同安全事宜（图源：美联社）

北约其时许诺不东扩，但实践上并没有恪守这一许诺。我剖析其原因是军事联盟根本上是靠所谓的“要挟”才干存在和开展。像北约这样的巨无霸，并没有跟着暗斗的完毕而消失。相反，它还想扩张。因而，它有必要要有一个巨大的要挟来证明自己存在的含义。这个要挟不止于反恐，应对这类小打小闹尽管有用，但无法成为如此巨大的军事集团存在的理由。因而，它需求更大的要挟，而这个要挟有必要是俄罗斯。谁最像苏联？俄罗斯不是苏联，但俄罗斯当然最像苏联。因而，（俄罗斯是要挟）就成了实践。北约一向对俄罗斯的正告不闻不问，或许是由于赢得了暗斗，所以太自负了。

然后是“势力规模”这个概念，这是一个脏词，没人会揭露议论它。可是，假如俄罗斯以为存在势力规模，假如俄罗斯以为与乌克兰真是同一个民族，假如俄罗斯想用兵器和武力保卫自己的势力规模，那么定论便是，对俄罗斯来说，势力规模是存在的。

当然，每个人都了解战役是严酷的，但假如西方只议论乌克兰领土上产生的工作，而不提及战役的本源，为什么会产生这场战役，那么欧洲就没有安全可言。由于在欧洲，安全架构实践上是树立在俄罗斯与北约之间的退让之上，未来也会是这样。北约可以宣称自己没有逼迫任何国家参加，为了不怕俄罗斯，一切国家都会自愿参加。这些都是彻底实在的。

但这种扩张让俄罗斯十分不舒服。在某种程度上，北约实践上现已把自己面向了核战役的门槛。因而，我描绘北约现状是“仍在行走的僵尸”，而不是马克龙说过的北约“脑死亡”。这便是欧洲其时形势。无关好恶，欧洲都有必要与俄罗斯达到退让。不然，欧洲将永久日子在惊骇之中。

《旁观者》：您对北约前史的描绘是不是有点片面？不只仅西方仍将俄罗斯视为前苏联，俄罗斯也很有一些人希望回到前苏联的光芒年月。然后，他们就把自己与西方敌对起来。西方有些人会说，假如俄罗斯完成民主化，假如俄罗斯尊重主权，那么北约自身就十分欢迎俄罗斯参加。俄罗斯纷歧定是敌人，但当下的俄罗斯成了敌人。当下的俄罗斯不便是苏联崩溃后，尤其是在普京治下构成的俄罗斯吗？

周波：我觉得你有关俄罗斯对国际次序的情绪不尽合理这点说得对。我以为俄罗斯是以曩昔展望未来。这是俄罗斯的问题地点。俄罗斯很恋旧，普京议论过苏联的鼎盛时期，质疑过“没有俄罗斯的国际”有什么用。我在《金融时报》宣布的议论中提出了这样一个问题：“没有国际，俄罗斯安在？”假如你运用核兵器，国际安在？俄罗斯又安在？这是一个问题。总归，我以为这种“俄罗斯是大国”的心态现已深深地扎根于俄罗斯人的认识中，而苏联的崩溃或许也加重了这种苦涩之感。

让咱们谈谈国际次序吧。我参加的慕尼黑安全会议，其得出的根本定论是彻底过错的，简直错得离谱。会议陈述定论称，国际一边是我国、俄罗斯这两个独裁修正主义国家，另一边是西方民主国家，我国和俄罗斯正在应战国际次序，而西方面对的问题是对全球南边国家的重视不行，需求改进自己。

但这一根本定论是过错的。我国对国际次序的情绪与俄罗斯不同，我国自改革开放以来就获益于与西方的互动。我国之所以获得巨大成就，是由于我国乐意学习，乐意与包含西方在内的国际各国融为一体。

但西方的问题在于它的自恋心态，以为二战后的国际次序仅仅自在主义的国际次序。这是彻底过错的。为什么呢？由于咱们有必要供认，不管咱们日子在什么当地，都存在着一种次序，这种次序或许是平衡的，也或许是失衡的，但次序是存在的。问题是，咱们怎样界说这种次序？在我看来，次序自身是由不同部分组成的：首要，它是由不同的社会准则、不同的宗教、不同的文明、不同的民族特性组成的，其间有些民族特性或许现已连续了几千年，相对比较静态，并不那么易变。

二是那些不断刻画国际次序的严重工作，例如，第二次国际大战之后产生了多少严重工作！比方非洲大陆的独立运动，包含了53个国家。53个国家的独立可不是小事。其时也存在两个阵营的对立，一边是以北约为首的阵营，另一边是以华约为首的阵营。从这个视点来看，你怎样能说第二次国际大战后的次序就彻底是自在主义的国际次序？西方就这么无知吗？此外，我国的兴起又怎样说？这些都产生在第二次国际大战之后。

因而，是各种严重工作刻画了国际次序。而西方的问题在于，它以为它协助树立的经济规矩、准则和一些宪法便是国际次序，而对我来说，这些仅仅国际的一部分，而不是整个国际。

《旁观者》：您看到了一个由不同国家文明、不同政治文明构成的更多元的大环境，自在主义仅仅其间一个分支，即西方分支。就国际社会而言，自二战以来，一向存在着其他的政治文明。

周波：是的。这种西方崇奉的风险在于，假如只信任自在主义的国际次序，变得自恋，又以为民主准则不再微弱开展——“自在之家”的陈述显现自2006年以来，西方民主一向在阑珊——西方就会被反噬，就开端责备其他国家，信任自己才是正确的，信任自己是保护自在国际次序的主体。当西方发现国际并不是在民主化，就变得懊丧，环顾四周，就找到我国和俄罗斯背锅。当然，我国和俄罗斯也是不同的。

《旁观者》：我在想，西方对自在主义所持有的那种近乎普世主义的国际观，是否是西方如此忧虑我国兴起的部分原因，由于西方以为，在暗斗之后，自在主义次序在统治着国际。因而，假如有人要应战自在主义次序，那么对方的次序也是普世主义的。但你的意思是说，假如我国成为国际超级大国，逾越美国，我国人希望看到的其实更是一个多极国际，而不是一个由我国领导的独裁国际次序。我以为这正是西方国家对我国兴起的忧虑地点。

周波：我以为的确是这样的，由于我国从来没有提出要树立一个单极国际。我国从来没有像美国那样说自己是“山巅之城”，也从来没有像前美国国务卿奥尔布赖特（Madeleine Albright）那样自称“不行或缺的”，我国从来没有这样说过。我国常说，由于这触及多方，那就让咱们一同来做。我国议论的是人类命运共同体，习近平主席提出的这一雄伟设想有三大支柱。一个是全球安全主张，另一个是全球开展主张，还有一个全球文明主张。

一些批评者说，这些都是十分抽象的准则，没有细节。他们错了。为什么呢？在全球开展主张下，现已有“一带一路”主张，这是很详细的，尽管只需十年的前史。十年前，没有人知道它是什么。但10年之后，这现已成为简直众所周知的国际概念。因而，这不是一个空泛的主意，我国为此投入了数万亿美元。一些人质疑“一带一路”是我国的圈套，我会反诘，你会花数万亿美元去布设一个圈套吗？你会这么做吗？

关于“全球安全主张”，咱们在其框架下也有一些海外举动。现在，解放军在海外有三种举动，即反海盗、维和和救灾。这三种举动有个总称，从专业视点讲，这是一种“非战役军事举动”，咱们称之为 MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War)，都是人道主义性质的。

例如，在亚丁湾冲击海盗的举动中，咱们驱散了海盗，咱们抓捕了海盗，但没有妄图杀死他们，咱们不想杀任何人。迄今为止，我国在海外也没有杀过一个人。咱们对这样的行为十分慎重。这与北约、美国在海外的活动和军事举动构成了鲜明对比。在他们的举动中，有多少人被故意或无意地杀戮或受伤？

《旁观者》：您不以为这仅仅一个时刻问题吗？从我国和美国成为超级大国的时刻线来看，美国现已领先了100年，从20世纪初便是超级大国。而我国，正如你所说，只需在改革开放后才真实成为国际强国，并且仍在不断进步中。我国的戎行当然还没有去当国际差人，由于还没有必要，也没钱这么做。可是，当我国变得更强壮，假如对台湾采纳军事举动，莫非也不会考虑杀台湾人吗？还有人会说到，在中印鸿沟上那些被我国战士损伤和杀戮的战士。是否由于我国还没走到那步？现在没有不意味着将来不会有。

周波：这（平和）是我对我国未来最大的希望。我信任这是或许的。没有人能必定地说我国将来会像一个平和主义者相同不杀一人。但前史会给咱们一些指引，那便是假如与其他一些国家比较，我国的兴起的确是十分平和的。

让咱们来谈谈中印之间的边境抵触，即便这次抵触已形成20名印度战士和4名我国战士丧生，但这仅仅一场丧命的打架，意味着两头并没有妄图向对方开枪。也便是说，在21世纪，中印两国戎行在以石器时代的方法打架。为什么？由于两头潜认识都知道，在任何状况下都不应该向对方开枪。印度战士的确朝天鸣枪示警过，但到现在为止，咱们并没有彼此开枪。中印抵触好像是你能找到（我国参加抵触）的仅有比方。

2020年6月，我国与印度边防部队在加勒万河谷产生抵触（图源：CCTV）

至于台湾问题，不用说，这是一个我国内政问题。但我真诚地信任，咱们有最大的诚心，会尽最大的尽力争取平和共同。对大陆来说，台湾被打得四分五裂又有什么用呢？况且岛上还有那么多同胞，价值太大了。

《旁观者》：但据我了解，自蔡英文2016年中选以来，北京还没有与她谈过话。

周波：没错。那我问你，北京为什么要跟蔡英文的上一任马英九谈，而不跟她谈？由于大陆以为，尽管马英九没有给出共同的时刻表，大陆也没有给出共同的时刻表，但大陆对马英九依然赞同台湾是我国的一部分是有必定决心的。

所以，尽管咱们不知道什么时分可以共同，但咱们知道，只需沿着这条路走下去，总有一天，咱们依然可以成为一个大家庭，这便是咱们的决心，所以咱们并不那么忧虑。

因而，咱们给了马英九当局许多优惠的经济利益。咱们也没有妄图搅扰台湾与十几个国家的“交际”联络。可是蔡英文的状况就彻底不同了，咱们对她彻底没有决心。

《旁观者》：但这不只仅是她的问题，由于她曾两次中选。我以为台湾不希望成为中华人民共和国一部分的民意在添加。与之相关的是，你怎样看待我国处理香港问题的方法？在《国家安全法》公布后，香港有人移居台湾，台湾看到一国两制的走向，为什么想要参加其间呢？

周波：我觉得这跟教育有很大联络，由于台湾跟大陆别离了那么久，一切这些声响都在宣扬“台独”。

但我也在考虑这个问题。例如，我国很快就将成为国际最大经济体。在新冠疫情之前，英国人猜测这在2028年就会产生，这是最达观的猜测。现在，鉴于我国人口老龄化和经济显着放缓，人们好像不那么达观了。但我信任，即便再过几年，这个方针仍是可以完成的。这莫非不会改动台湾人的思想，让他们以为自己是国际上最强壮国家的一部分吗？有些人的心态不会由于任何原因而改动，但有些人是有或许改动心态的。在这个问题上，需求看的不仅仅台湾人会怎样想，还要重视大陆人怎样看待两岸共同。

《旁观者》：此话怎讲？

周波：我的意思是，台湾的未来不只由台湾人决议，也由大陆人决议，由于咱们以为台湾是我国的一部分。因而，不只他们可以决议自己的未来，大陆也可以决议台湾的未来。

《旁观者》：你关于经济的观念十分风趣，由于这是我在与中方就香港和台湾问题攀谈时常常听到的，他们十分垂青更好的经济、更强壮的国家等物质要素的重要性，而很少提及民主、言辞自在等价值观的寻求，一说后者就说到教育问题，正如你今日所说的那样。已然台湾此时并不为我国经济实力所动，而台湾自身在各个范畴的经济体现都十分好，那为什么将来就会改动呢？我觉得这暴露了一种特别唯物主义的国际观，我以为北京的许多人都有这种国际观，这很有意思。

周波：实践便是台湾通过与大陆的经济互动获益匪浅。有许多台湾人日子在大陆，比方在上海，听说共有150万台湾人在大陆日子。说到这个数字，我就在想，或许许多台湾中产阶级实践上日子在大陆。在上海，他们的日子十分舒适。这些人至少应该是中产阶级，不然他们或许住不起上海。我曾与一位法国人攀谈，他说仅在上海就或许有10万法国人。也便是说，这种社会准则上的差异对他们来说并不重要。

11月23日，台湾大选提名人承认前最终一次一次议论“蓝白合”的商洽（图源：台湾联合报）

此外，我信任大陆实践上会为台湾供给适当宽恕的共同条件，中央政府现已提出了许多提议。咱们现已屡次表明，这些提议都是可以商洽的。可是，将台湾从我国别离出去，这对咱们来说是无法承受的。

《旁观者》：我想回到俄乌战役上。但在此之前，我想问最终一个关于台湾的问题，那便是，您以为我国对台湾采纳军事举动的或许性有多大？一些美国军方消息来源称或许在2025年之前。鉴于您与戎行的联络，您的观念是是什么？假如没有时刻表，那么您以为什么是红线，会让我国觉得平和共同已不或许，是时分采纳军事举动了？

周波：你提了几个关键。首要，我知道你说的美国军方是谁，那是美国四星大将迈克·米尼汉，他是美国空中机动司令部司令，他说过相似的话。

但问题是，就连他的上级五角大楼也不赞同他的说法。五角大楼指出，他的言辞与五角大楼的评价不符。因而，我对他的言辞有许多疑问。

每个人都有自己的直觉，这没问题。但他怎样能单凭直觉说出这些会产生严重后果的话，并且还以备忘录的方法发给部属？这让我感到十分古怪，我阅读了一切关于他的言辞的媒体报道，却找不到任何支撑他的观念的统计数据。这种直觉真可怕。

这也表明晰中美联络其时的一些应战，那便是美国国内方针的割裂实践上会给其交际方针带来紊乱。人们并不常常议论这一点，但交际方针无疑是国内政治的延伸。现在看美国，即便作为局外人，看到美国国内变得如此割裂，咱们也很忧虑，由于这也会给咱们带来费事。

这种割裂体现在不同层面，包含三个兵种之间以及戎行内部，比方一位将军和他的上司表达了纷歧致的定见。而立法部分和行政部分之间也存在不合。例如，拜登和五角大楼都不支撑佩洛西窜访台湾，但她仍是去了。这些状况加在一同，实践上会产生许多问题。坦率地说，拜登自身便是个弱势总统。因而，总的看来，要处理好这种联络是十分困难的。这对咱们来说是一个巨大的应战。

再回到你关于大陆发起军事进犯的或许性有多大这个问题上。在咱们的反割裂国家法中，咱们现已清晰指出，大陆只或许在三种状况下以非平和方法处理台湾问题。一是台湾宣布独立，这看起来是不或许的，他们不会那么愚笨。第二种状况是导致台湾与大陆别离的严重工作，我尽力考虑这种工作或许是什么，我以为佩洛西窜访台湾或许归于这一类。

第三种状况是，大陆以为平和共同的或许性现已不复存在了。因而，关于最终一点，我的主张是，有必要让我国大陆信任，咱们依然可以与台湾完成平和共同，要让咱们信任有值得保护的平和，就像咱们在维和中常说的那样。要让咱们信任台湾海峡的平和可以保持。

那么问题来了，美国该怎样做？美国向我国和台湾开释的信号不仅仅对立的，并且彻底是混淆视听，彻底是不负职责的。我以为，我国和美国都不想产生抵触，这是实践。但问题是，首要，咱们有必要在手法上达到共同，即通过什么途径才干真实尽力保持这种联络，使其尽或许平和？其次，有哪些真实或许损坏两头联络安稳的问题？这是或许导致咱们堕入抵触的两方面。我不以为咱们现在能就这些问题达到共同，所以两头的言辞越来越剧烈，这是不健康的，也引出了一个问题，究竟谁应为此负更大的职责？

《旁观者》：您关于军事举动前提条件的第二和第三点，看上去包括规模都很大。假如佩洛西到台湾都可以被视为台湾从我国大陆别离的一步，那么我以为太简略将许多工作归入这一类了。上一年产生这件事时，我不了解的是，为什么北京不能说，咱们欢迎佩洛西议长拜访咱们美丽的台湾省，也请到大陆来拜访。为什么挑选以十分强硬的方法正面交锋，而不是运用更为油滑的交际手法？我本以为后者是我国文明的精妙之处。为什么在海峡两岸问题上没有更多地运用这种方法呢？

周波：西方有些人和你观念相同，这其间当然有许多原因。我国大陆以为台湾是我国的一部分。由于两岸联络十分不和谐，所以不或许呈现你所描绘的那种“夸姣”的状况，现阶段是不或许的。

2022年8月2日，美国时任众议长佩洛西窜访台湾（图源：纽约时报）

《旁观者》：我想把论题拉回到俄罗斯上，由于我国提出了咱们一向在议论的平和方案。但假如我国真的关怀平和，莫非不应该在这方面做得更多，而不只仅是说说罢了吗？

周波：我觉得咱们要有耐性。耐性的确是我国人的美德。当你考虑我国人的心态时，你也有必要紧记这一点。

让我举两个比方。一是我国的改革开放。我国其时没有路线图，但我以为，到现在为止，我国人可以说是长于在没有路线图的状况下找到前行路途。怎样在40年内让8亿人脱节贫穷？没有路线图，但咱们做到了。我方才说到的“一带一路”主张，十年前无人了解，但10年后，你会看到它产出的无数个详细项目。

因而，我以为我国在此次俄乌战役中扮演的人物，首要是以建设性的方法向前迈出了真实的一步。由于在曩昔，我国的情绪更多的是一种奇妙的中立。但提出这一平和情绪自身便是向前迈出的一大步。

而我国的思想方法总是先考虑一些大的概念，先把结构搭好，然后再用砖块填充。你可以看一下我国在六方商洽中的人物，也便是在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的人物，以及我国在伊朗核问题上的人物，也便是所谓的 JCPOA(《关于伊朗核方案的全面协议》 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)。在六方商洽中，我国便是实践上的倡导者，和谐各方，发挥了十分重要的效果。而在 JCPOA 中，我国仅仅一个相等的参加者，我国的效果并不比六方商洽中的效果大。因而，我国在以不同的方法发挥效果。

在俄乌战役这个问题上，我国有一个共同的优势，那便是我国与俄罗斯的杰出联络。假如俄罗斯乐意听取任何一方的定见，这一方最有或许便是我国。因而，我国有许多发挥的潜力。这场战役不会很快完毕，我信任，在未来的日子里，由于国际在某种程度大将会愈加仰仗我国。只需战役久拖不决，人们就会愈加等待我国发挥积极效果，而这种希望有时会成为压力，促进我国做得更多。咱们不走回头路，我国现已向前迈出了建设性的一步，我信任还会有第二步、第三步。

关于我国能做什么，这不是个问题。我国当下其实什么也做不了，由于参加方都不乐意停火，不管是俄罗斯、乌克兰仍是美国。假如咱们要议论平和，第一步当然是停火。但现在这些国家都不想停火。因而，只需当这些国家决议停火时，我国才干供给协助，到时不仅仅我国供给协助，或许还有其他国家也想协助。因而，我国只能在最合适的时分介入。

《旁观者》：AUKUS（注：美英澳三边安全同伴联络）也有最新消息。英国首相与美国总统和澳大利亚总理一同站在讲台上，议论其远景。他们没有过多提及我国，但这一组织明显跟我国有关。所以我想知道，从您的视点来看，我国怎样看待AUKUS？

周波：AUKUS必定是针对我国的，不然你无法解释澳大利亚为什么需求核动力潜艇。假定中澳产生抵触，抵触会产生在哪里？不或许在澳大利亚海域吧？咱们对澳大利亚没有任何妄图，咱们的战略重点也不在那里。所以，抵触只能在南海、台湾海峡或台湾海峡邻近。也便是说，他们的军舰会接近我国。这是仅有合乎逻辑的定论。

11月14日，澳方责备中方对澳军舰“图文巴”（Toowoomba ）号护卫舰水手运用声呐脉冲（图源：路透社）

可是，这八艘潜艇能对澳大利亚有多大协助呢？我以为，这实践上会给他们带来更多的费事，而不是优点。为什么这么说呢？澳大利亚没有核工业，为了这八艘核潜艇，他们有必要从零开端开展核工业，而这些核潜艇还有必要在其他当地制作。核潜艇的保护将是一个大问题。因而，这些工作实践上会给他们带来许多费事。此外，从底子上说，我以为这种投入是由于（美国对）澳大利亚的忽悠，澳大利亚实践上是在补助美军，美军在这一区域没有满足的舰艇和人力。

从前史上看，具有挖苦意味的是，澳大利亚总是在打他人的战役，他们都不是为自己交兵，不管是（土耳其）加里波利、越南仍是阿富汗战役，他们总是在打他人的战役，他们从未仔细考虑过怎样搞交际平衡。

我以为，从战略上讲，他们会真实感受到继续的苦楚，由于他们就坐落亚太区域。跟着我国日益强壮，我想许多人都会质疑澳大利亚如此盲目地与美国结盟，是否是正确的决议，由于这是十分匆促的决议，没有通过充沛的洽谈，许多人都表明敌对，不管是前总理保罗·基廷总理仍是前总理特恩布尔，他们都表明敌对。

《旁观者》：那么在台湾问题上，正如您所说，这一切都与我国有关，与台湾海峡有关。AUKUS怎样改动我国对处理台湾问题的计划？

周波：AUKUS当然会使我国政府的决议计划变得愈加杂乱，但它不会改动游戏规矩，就这么简略。想想那八艘核动力潜艇吧，它们何时可以出产，何时可以布置，何时可以投入运用？这至少需求10年的时刻。但是此前，人们根本上以为第一艘潜艇将在2040年前布置。

即便在10年后就开端布置，让我问你，解放军水兵在此期间将会变得有多强壮？就潜艇而言，解放军的潜艇数量乃至超过了美国，尽管其间也需求考虑质量差异，我国大多数潜艇都是惯例潜艇，但突变可带来突变，数量也很重要。我国的潜艇在质量上也有很大的进步。10年后，我国人民解放军水兵会变得有多强壮？这八艘潜艇对咱们又有多大实践含义呢？正如我之前所说，这或许仅仅使咱们的决议计划杂乱化，由于咱们有必要将其考虑在内，但这并不会改动游戏规矩。

《旁观者》：谢谢你承受采访。

（翻译：李泽西核译：韩桦）

英文原文如下：

The Spectator: Zhou Bo, welcome to Chinese Whispers. Now, China's position has often been criticized in the west for being too supportive of Russia. What's your understanding of China's position on the war?

Zhou Bo: I think, as a comment on China Russian relationship, it’s really not said in the West that if you look at this most important relationship in the world, just like China US relationship, you have to put it first of all on a bilateral context. And if you put that in bilateral context, you would know that China is Russia's largest neighbor and vice versa. The problem with China now is that China, because of its weight and heft, is actually associated with everything that doesn't seem to have anything to do with China. And this is the price you have to pay as a great power. And because of the war in Ukraine, of course, and because of the China Russia's good relationship, definitely people would ask a question about this relationship that makes a lot of sense.

But on this Russia Ukrainian war, I think China has already contributed a lot, at least on two issues that are basically underappreciated in the west, as I have written in Financial Times a few days ago. First of all, China didn't throw wood into the fire. Well, this may just sound somewhat empty, but think of China's weight and think of China's military. If China joins Russia, this is already the dawn of the Third World War. So people have to realize that how China actually has contributed to peace in Europe, by not picking a side. Then the second thing is China has made it crystal clear that we are against any possible use of nuclear weapons in Europe. I first wrote on this that was published in FT. When President Xi Jinping met with Olaf Shultz, the German chancellor, he reiterated this firm decade old Chinese policy, which was reiterated during his meeting with Joe Biden at G20.

So far, we have made two distinctive contributions for peace in Europe. And then China, of course, is going to do more. And people talk about China's possibility of providing lethal military support to Russia, which is totally impossible because that doesn't make any sense. If China does, of course, it won't go unnoticed. And why should China do that when China actually is tabling a peace proposal for resolution of the conflict?

The Spectator: On the question of lethal aid, some people would say that if American intelligence is so confident that China is considering this, that kind of affords it an authority, a trustedness in this kind of intelligence, even though we haven't seen it ourselves. How can you say for sure that China is not considering it?

Zhou Bo: Because it's not in China's own interests. The question is, why should China be dragged into a conflict that is far away from China, which is between Russia, one of the strongest nation on earth, and Ukraine, which has China as its largest trading partner. And this is an unprecedented war in the heart of Europe. And why should China pick a side and get yourself involved? It doesn't make any sense.

The Spectator: So, you've mentioned that this is a question that makes sense to ask of China because China is now a global player. And we talk about America being this global policeman, and China is clearly wanting to take more responsibilities in the world now that it's the second largest economy. But you then say it doesn't want to take sides in this war. I mean, isn't it shirking its responsibilities as a global player?

Zhou Bo: China is different from a small country in that a small country would probably consider more about itself and its ambience, right? And its military would simply want to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. China is no exception. But China as a major power has two things more. One is it has global economic interests that it has to safeguard. Besides, great power shoulders great responsibility. Therefore, China also shoulders a greater responsibility. China has to safeguard its own sovereignty and territory integrity, which is unusual for a major power like China because China has not become reunified. But at the same time, it has to also consider something else, that is how to defend its overseas interest and how to shoulder these great international responsibilities. But in terms of security, China's primary concern is still about his doorsteps, that is South China Sea, that is Taiwan Strait, all these kinds of issues. So if you know how China has been concerned with all these issues, which are becoming more and more suffice with what we perceive to be foreign interferences, you would understand China should have no interest whatsoever to be involved in a war far away in Europe.

The Spectator: The lengthy border between China and Russia at the moment I understand is the least militarized it has been in decades. And is that part of the reason why China doesn't want to make an enemy of Russia as well?

Zhou Bo: You see, neighbors won't move away. So this is just the reality, both for China and for Russia. And we are just the largest neighbor to each other. And because of the not necessarily all pleasant history, China now with its border issue totally resolved with Russia, should have all reasons to maintain this good neighbor policy with Russia. And they would think likewise, I believe. That's what I said in the beginning. When people think about relationship, mostly they think they would put it in a different context and would look at it through third eye. But if you look at this relationship, either by Chinese or by Russians, they know this is the priority, that we must remain friendly with this biggest neighbor. And this is about the foreign policy. And in terms of practicalities, there are also so many things that we should consider because even in the long run, Russia would be useful for China economically and vice versa. So there are huge interests.

Right now, I think the west is somewhat biased because the war in the heart of Europe, they would just examine this relationship from a kind of western context, which automatically would become somewhat biased.

The Spectator: Now, you mentioned the peace plan that China has recently released. The first point of the peace plan is respect for sovereignty, something that you've also mentioned so far. In light of all of these different interests and reasons to be friendly with Russia, isn't it the case that sovereignty has taken a back seat when it comes to China's foreign policy? China has always talked about sovereignty as an important part of its foreign policy. I understood that respect for sovereignty as a legacy of our brutalized recent history. But now it feels pretty empty when a sovereign nation is being invaded and China won't do anything about it.

Zhou Bo: No, I don't think China's proposal is empty, because ever since day one when this war came out, China has been talking about two sides of the same coin. The only thing is, I think the West has become kind of selectively blind towards the two sides of the same coin, because they talked about how China has not been crystal clear about this war being an invasion. But when China talks about respect for sovereignty, we actually have gently criticized Russia. But because China's relationship with Russia is friendly, so we did not put it out so bluntly. But this attitude about respect of sovereignty is talked about in the very beginning and it could not be misunderstood. But on the other hand, we do have some sympathies toward Russia as to why this war just came out, because ever since Soviet Union, soviet leader like Gorbachev down to Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and President Putin have invariably warned against such NATO expansions.

NATO from time pledged not to expand, but it didn't actually keep this promise. And I have a reason why this has happened, because military alliances basically live on so called threats. They need threats to survive and to thrive. And for such juggernauts like NATO, it did not go away with the end of the Cold War. Instead, it wants to expand. Therefore, it has to have a big threat to justify its own existence. It's not about counter terrorism, these kinds of things, petty small things that are useful, but not totally useful for such big military bloc. So they need something bigger, which has to be Russia because who looks most like Soviet Union? Russia is not the Soviet Union, but of course, Russia looks most like Soviet Union. So in this regard, this turned out to be the reality. They have been turning the deaf ear to whatever warnings from Russia, probably they're just a bit too arrogant because they have won the Cold War.

Then come this concept of sphere of influence, it of course is a dirty word, nobody would really talk about it openly. But if Russia believes there is sphere of influence, if Russia believes Ukrainian are really one people, you can imagine how they feel. So if Russia would like to defend its sphere of influence with arms, with forces, then the conclusion is, for Russia, there is sphere of influence. So right now the west just talk about what is happening on the soil of Ukraine. Of course, everybody understand war is cruel, but without referring to the very causes, why it happened at all, there is no security in Europe, because in Europe the security architecture actually stands only on compromises between Russia and NATO, and even in the future, it would be something like this. NATO can say, NATO is not forcing any country to join and all countries to be not afraid of Russia would volunteer to join. These are totally true. That is correct. But with this kind of expansion makes Russia extremely uncomfortable. And to some extent, NATO has actually driven itself to the threshold of a nuclear war. So this is a zombie that is still walking. This is not a brain dead as Macron said, I described as a zombie that is walking. So right now, this is what is happening in Europe. You have to find a compromise with Russia, like it or not. Otherwise, you will always live in fear, in panic.

The Spectator: Well, Zhou Bo, isn't your version of history of NATO a little bit one sided by the sense that, I mean, it's not just the west that still sees Russia as the USSR, it seems that some people in Russia still see themselves or want to go back to the glory days of the Soviet Union. And then they put themselves against the west as a kind of counter. Some people in the west would say if Russia were to democratize, if Russia were to respect sovereignty, then it would very well much be welcomed into NATO itself. Russia is not necessarily the enemy, but Russia as it is at the moment is, I mean, it isn't that part of what has been brought on by how Russia has been governed since the fall of the Soviet Union as well, especially under Putin?

Zhou Bo: I think you're right in that Russia is not totally justifiable in the attitude toward the international order, for example, because I believe Russia would look to the future from the past. And that is the problem with Russia. Russia's nostalgic, Putin talked about the heydays of the Soviet Union and he talked about what is the use of the world without Russia. And then in my opinion that was publishing the FT, I ask this question, and where is Russia without the world? If you use nuclear weapon, where is the world? And then where is Russia? That's a problem. So I believe this kind of mentality of Russia being a great power is deeply embedded in Russian people's mentality. And probably this kind of dissolution of Soviet Union has actually add to this kind of acrimony.

But then let's talk about something else, about international order. When people at this Munich security conference, which I attended recently, the basic conclusion is totally wrong, and it cannot be more wrong, because according to the report, Munich Conference, the conclusion is that on one side is China, Russia, two autocratic revisionist and then on the other side is western democracy. And the conclusion is China and Russia are challenging international order and the west, yes, has also met some problems, that is, it has not pay enough attention to the countries in the global south. Therefore, we should do something to improve ourselves.

But this kind of basic conclusion is wrong. China's attitude toward international order is different from Russia's because China has benefited from interacting with the west since reform and opening up. So China's tremendous achievements is because it is ready to learn. It is ready to integrate itself with the rest of the world, including the west. But the problem with western mentality is that it is narcissistic, because it believes the international order after Second World War is just Liberal international order. This is totally wrong. Why? Because we must admit that whenever we live, there is something like order and this order may be balanced or imbalanced somewhere but there is an order. But the question is how do we define this order? The order itself, in my opinion is made of different legs: first it is composed of different social systems, different religions, different cultures, different national identities and some of these may just have lasted for millenniums, this identity of a nation. So this kind of thing, some of them are very static, they're not so volatile.

The second layer is the major events that have constantly shape this international order, for example after second world war, you can imagine how many major events have occurred. We're not talking about some small things. We’re talking about the Independent movement of Africa continent, which include 53 countries. The independence of 53 countries is no small thing. Then there was also the rivalry of two camps led by NATO on one side and Warsaw Pact on the other side. So even talking about this, how do you know that the order of the Second World War is totally liberal international order? Are you so ignorant? And then how about the rise of China? This all happened after Second World War. So these major events have shaped this order. And the problem with the west is that it believes that the economic rules and regimes and some of the constitutions it has helped to established are the international order, which for me are just a part of the world but not the whole world.

The Spectator: So you see a much more diverse environment of different national cultures, political cultures, that liberalism is just one strand of that, the western strand. But internationally, there are other political cultures that have always existed since World War Two.

Zhou Bo: Yeah, but the danger of this kind of western belief is that if you believe in the Liberal international order, actually it hurts yourself because you become narcissist, and because if you believe democracy is no longer thriving as found by Freedom House, ever since 2006, western democracy has been declining. So you start to blame other countries, because you believe you're the right one, because you believe you're the one holding the Liberal international order. And you find that the world is not moving this way, and the world in the future is not moving this way. So you become frustrated and you start to look around. And then you find China and Russia to blame. But China, Russia are still different.

The Spectator: I wonder if that almost universalist view of the world that the west holds about liberalism is partly why it fears so much China's rise, in that it believes that there's a Liberal order ruling the world after, let's say, the Cold War. And so if anyone's going to challenge that Liberal order, then their order would also be universalist. But are you saying that if China were to be the world superpower, it were to overtake the US, what the Chinese see is actually more of a multipolar world rather than a Chinese led authoritarian world order. I think that's a large part of the fear of western countries about China's rise.

Zhou Bo: I think that is true, because China never propose to have a unipolar world. China never talks like the United States that it a city upon the hill. China never said like Madeleine Albright that United States is indispensable，either. China never talked in that way. China always says that, okay, because this involves everybody, let's do it together. And China talks about the humanity of shared future. This grandiose concept of president Xi Jinping right now has three pillars under it. One is a global security initiative; another is global development initiative and the third one is global civilization initiative. Some critics say that these are very general principles without details. They’re wrong. Why? Let me tell you, under the global development initiative, we have already seen Belt and Road initiative, which is totally tangible because this has only a history of 10 years. Ten years ago, few people know what it means. But in 10 years, this becomes international phrase that almost all educated people know. So this is not empty idea. We have spent billions or trillions of dollars in it. It's not an empty idea. So that's why I talk to some people who say this is Chinese trap. I said, okay, would you spend trillions of dollars to lay a trap? Would you do that?

Then about Global Security Initiative, we also have something under it net that is a place operation overseas. Right now there are three types of operations by PLA overseas, that is counterpiracy, that is peacekeeping and that is disaster relief. But if you put all these operational altogether, they have a common name. Professionally speaking, it is a military operation other than war, what we called MOOTW. But these operations are just humanitarian in nature. For example, in counterpiracy in Gulf of Aden, we dispel pirates. We apprehended piracy, but we didn't try to kill them. We do not want to kill anyone. And so far overseas, China has not killed anyone. And we are extremely cautious in behaving like that. And this would come into such a sharp contrast with NATO, with the US activities, military operation overseas. How many people have been killed or injured purposefully or inadvertently by these operations?

The Spectator: Don’t you think that's just a matter of time in the sense that in the timeline of China and the US being superpowers, the US has had 100 years head start, let's say since the beginning of the 20th century. Whereas China, as you say, only really from reform and opening has it become a strong country internationally, and it is still a work in progress. So, of course, its army hasn't been going out there being the global policeman because it hasn't had needed to, hasn't had the money to do so. But are you really telling me that as China gets stronger, that it wouldn't consider killing people in Taiwan if it were to take military action over Taiwan? I mean, some people are talking about the Indian border would point to the soldiers who are hurt and killed by Chinese soldiers. I mean, isn't it just that China hasn't had that kind of role so far, but that doesn't mean it won't have it in the future.

Zhou Bo: Well, this is my best hope for China in the future. And I believe it is still possible. Nobody can say for sure that China would really behave like a pacifist without any killing in the future. But history may just give us some guidance, that is China's rise is very peaceful indeed if you compare it with some other countries. So let's talk about the border clash between China and India. Even if this clash has claimed the life of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers. This is deadly brawl. That means we did not try to shoot at each other. So that means in 21st century, the troops of China and India are fighting in a manner only found in Stone Age. And why is that? Because both sides subconscious know that they should not shoot at each other in any circumstances. The Indian soldiers did shoot into the sky to give a kind of warning, but so far we have not been shooting at each other. So this is true, and this is almost the only example that you can find in the kind of clashes.

And then about the Taiwan issue, this is, of course, needless to say, this is a domestic issue. But I genuinely believe that we have uttermost sincerity and would make utmost efforts to try to get reunified peacefully, because what is the use of Taiwan that totally battered and shattered for us, let alone there are so many people on the island. So the cost would be too high for us.

The Spectator: But as I understand it, President Xi hasn't talked to President Cai since she was elected in 2016.

Zhou Bo: That is true. But then come this question, why would President Xi talk to, Ma Ying-jeou, Cai's predecessor and not to her? Because we in mainland believe Ma Ying-jeou did not give a timetable for reunification. Mainland did not give out timetable for reunification. But we in the mainland are somewhat confident that Ma Ying-jeou still agree to this kind of a general concept of Taiwan being part of one China. So we have some confidence in him. So that is why we know, we don't know when we could become reunited, but we know so long as we walk down the road, one day, we can become still a big family. This is our confidence. So we're not that much worried. Therefore, we give Ma Ying-jeou’s authority a lot of preferential economic benefits. And we did not try to disturb Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with about a dozen countries. But Cai, of course, is, it is a totally different story. And we don't have confidence in her either at all. The Spectator: But it's not just the question of her, right? I mean, she was elected twice. And I think there is increasing public opinion in Taiwan that doesn't want to become a part of the People's Republic of China. Part of that, in this greater context, what do you think of how China has dealt with Hong Kong? Not least because of the Hong Kong people who've moved to Taiwan in general after the National Security Law. But Taiwan can see what one country, two systems turns into. So why would it want to be a part of that? I mean, hasn't China kind of messed this one up?

Zhou Bo: I think it is also true that Taiwan has benefited hugely from economic interaction with mainland. And there are so many Taiwanese living in China, for example, in Shanghai, it's a huge number. I don't know exactly how many people live in the mainland, but sometimes people would talk about 1.5 million. I don't know. So when that figure was raised, I was thinking about this, probably a lot of people above middle class in Taiwan actually live in China. So these people of course should be middle class at least. Otherwise they cannot not afford to live in Shanghai. So that means in Shanghai, their lives are very comfortable. I once talk to a Frenchman and he said that there are probably 100,000 Frenchmen living in Shanghai alone. So that means this kind of a difference in social system doesn't really matter to them. Besides, we actually would make this kind of conditions for reunification quite tolerant for Taiwanese, I believe, because the central government has put forward a number of measures as proposals. And then, of course, this kind of things are always negotiable. And we have expressed time again that these kind of things are negotiable. But for Taiwan to be separated from mainland, this is not affordable for us.

Zhou Bo: I think it has a lot of things to do with education, because Taiwan has been separated from mainland for so long. And if all these voices are promoting a kind of independence.

But I'm also thinking about this issue. For example, it won't be too long before China becomes the largest economy in the world. Some people talked about 2028 in Britain, before pandemic. So that is the most optimistic forecast. Now people seems to be less optimistic given China's aging population and apparent slowdown economy. But I would believe, even if we take a few years more, this is still achievable. Then wouldn't that be a turning point in changing the mentality of Taiwanese people, if they consider themselves to be part of the strongest national on earth, wouldn't that change the mentality? Some people won't be changed for any reasons, but then there is, there is a possibility for them to change the mentality. And besides, on this issue, it's not only what Taiwanese would think about, it’s also about what the mainlanders would think about these two parts of being one China that also matters.

The Spectator: What do you mean by that?

Zhou Bo: I mean, the future of Taiwan is not only determined by Taiwanese, it is also determined by mainlanders because we believe Taiwan is part of China. So it's not only they can decide on their own future, it's that mainland could also decide on the future of Taiwan.

The Spectator: Your point about economics is really interesting because it's something that I've heard a lot from speaking to Chinese interlocutors about Hong Kong and about Taiwan, that so much is placed on the material goods of a better economy, of a stronger country, all of these sort of things, and very little is put on to a pursuit of values like democracy, freedom of speech, which then the answer becomes was one about education, as you've said today. Why would Taiwan care about China being the world's largest economy if it doesn't currently care now, and when Taiwan as a, you might not call it a country, but Taiwan as a set of islands is economically doing very well in all sorts of areas, I just don't know if—— I think it betrays a particularly materialistic view of the world that I think a lot of people in Beijing have, which I think is fascinating.

The Spectator: I want to bring this back to the Russia Ukraine war. But before I do, just one final question on Taiwan, which is that, what do you think is the possibility of military action over Taiwan from China in terms of an invasion? I mean, some American military sources have said it's before 2025, for example. You're someone with links to the military. I mean, what do you think about that? And what would be the threshold if not a timeline, then what would be the threshold that you think China would decide that peaceful reunification is not possible and therefore, this is the moment.

Zhou Bo: Your question that raise a few good points. First of all, I know who you're referring to, that is Americans four-star general Mike Minihan, who was the commander of Americans air Mobility Command, he said something like that. But the question is, even his superior Pentagon didn't agree with him. And Pentagon pointed out that his remarks are not in accordance with assessment of the Pentagon. So I have a lot of questions for his remarks. First of all, it is fine if someone has his gut feeling, right, we all have our own gut feeling on something. But how come that you would say something that is so consequential based on your gut feeling and you would send it in a memo to your subordinates? This is very weird for me because I have read all the media report on his remarks, but I could not find any statistics supporting his argument. And this kind of gut feeling is really horrendous.

And it tells me something about the difficulties in China US relationship, that is how a divided American domestic policy could actually bring chaos to its foreign policy. People don't often talk about that, but definitely foreign policy is the extension of domestic politics. And right now in the United States, even as outsiders, we are worried to see how the United States is becoming so domestically divided because this would create a problem for us. You see, this kind of division is manifested at different layers. It is between or among the three branches. It is within the military itself, just like the remarks of a general in disagreement with his superior. And it is found of apparently between the legislative branch and the executive branch. For example, like Nancy Pelosi's visit, Biden didn't like it, Pentagon didn't like it. But still, she went there, so all these things put together would actually create a lot of problems. And Biden himself is a weak President, frankly speaking. So putting all this together, it is extremely difficult to manage this relationship. That is a big challenge for us.

And then coming back to your questions about how likely a military attack is。In our anti-secession law, we have made it clear that this kind of non-peaceful means of resolving the Taiwan issue by mainland could only occur in three situations. One is that Taiwan would declare independence. This doesn't look possible. They're not so stupid to do that. The second thing is major events leading to the separation of Taiwan from mainland. I try to think hard about what this kind of events might be. And I would consider Nancy Pelosi’s a visit might be in this category.

The third situation is that mainland believe that the prospect for peaceful reunification is exhausted for good. So about this last point, my advice is that you have to let Chinese Mainland believe we can still reach peaceful reunification with Taiwan, so this won't happen. And for us to believe there is a peace to be maintained, as we often say in peacekeeping, right? For us in peacekeeping, we have to make sure that there is peace to be kept. And for us to believe that there is a peace to be kept across Taiwan Strait, then the question is, what United States should do? All these kind of signals sending to China, send to Taiwan are not conflicting, they're totally confusing, they're totally irresponsible. I think it is true that neither China nor the United States wants to have a conflict. But the problem is, first of all, we have to reach agreement on the instruments, through what channels could we actually try to maintain this relationship to make it as peaceful as possible? Second, what are the genuine issues that could actually destabilize this relationship? Two steps that we might slide into conflict. So all these things together, I don't believe we right now have an agreement on this, so you're saying the tones actually rising higher and higher, this is not healthy, but raises as a question, who is more responsible for this?

The Spectator: In your second and third points about those conditions for a military action, I mean, they're pretty big categories, they're really big categories. If Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan can be seen is a step towards Taiwan being separated from Chinese Mainland, then I think the bar is very low for something to count in that category. What I didn't understand when that was happening last year was, why Beijing couldn't say, we welcome Speaker Pelosi to our beautiful province of Taiwan, please come see us and do come into the mainland as well. You know, this kind of going head to head in a very strong way, instead of using slightly more diplomacy would I consider as Chinese deftness in cultural senses. Why isn't more of that being used when it comes to the problem over the strait? You know, why does a Pelosi visit have to become such a big deal, which I think partly was made such a big deal by Beijing's reaction.

Zhou Bo: There are some people in the west who have argued like you and I believe there are, of course, a number reason for that. The Chinese Mainland believes Taiwan is part of China. For the central government, you cannot go there to visit someone without my permission. And because this cross-strait relationship is so sour, there is no possibility for what you have described beautifully. So it is impossible at this stage.

The Spectator: And I want to bring us back to the Russian invasion because China has proposed this peace plan that we've been talking about. But if it really cares about peace, shouldn't it do more about that than just talk about it?

Zhou Bo: I think we'll have to be patient. Patience is really a virtue of Chinese. And so you, when you think about the Chinese mentality, you also got to bear this in mind. Let me give you two examples. One is China's reform and opening up. China didn't have a roadmap. But Chinese, I believe so far, can be said to be good at finding the road without a map, because the reform and opening up, they didn't have a map. And there is no such a map how you can shake off poverty of 800 million people within four decades. There is no roadmap. And we did it. And then about this Belt and Road Initiative which I mention just now, 10 years ago, what was it? In a nutshell, nobody understood it. But in 10 years' time, you see how it actually proliferated into so many things, so tangible around the world.

So, I believe China's role in this Russia Ukrainian war, firstly is a genuine step forward in a constructive way. Because in the past, China's position is more kind of nuanced neutrality. But putting forward this peace plan itself is a major step forward. And Chinese thinking is always think about some big concepts to lay out the structure first before fulfilling it with concrete bricks, for example, and so forth. Then you come to think about the China's role first in the six Party talks, which is on the denuclearization in Korean Peninsula and China's role in the Iranian nuclear issue, which is called JCPOA. So in the first example, China basically is the de facto leader, coordinating all the parties together. So China played a very significant role. And then in JCPOA, China is just an equal participant. China role is not bigger than the one in the six party talks. So China have different ways of playing its role.

But on this issue, the conflict in Europe, China has a unique advantage, that is China's good relation with Russia. If Russia would like to listen to anyone, most probably it is China now. So China has a lot of potentials to play. And this war would not finish very soon. So I believe, in the days to come, because in part the world is looking up to China all the more, so long as the war drags on, people would simply have more expectation for China to play positive role. And this kind of expectation can sometime become the pressure for China to do more. So there is no going back. China has already made a constructive step forward and I believe there would be second or third steps to come.

But then the question is, what can China do? It's not really a question of what China can do. China cannot do anything right now because no one would like to see a ceasefire, be it Russia, Ukraine, or the United States. So if we talk about peace, the first step, of course, is ceasefire. But none of these countries now want to ceasefire. So China can only help when these countries decide to have a ceasefire, right? And it's not only China that is helping. There might be other countries who wants to help. So China can only jump in at a time that is most appropriate.

The Spectator: There's also been this announcement around AUKUS, where the British prime minister has stepped on the podium with the American president and the Australian prime minister to talk about what this deal could look like. Now, they didn't mention China much, but it's clearly got China in mind. So I wondered, from your perspective, what does the view look like on AUKUS from Beijing?

Zhou Bo: AUKUS is definitely against China, because otherwise you cannot explain why Australia would need nuclear power submarines. Just give you a scenario. If China and Australia have a conflict, where can it be? It cannot be in the waters of Australia, right? We have no purposes whatsoever against Australia, and our strategic focus is not in that direction. It can only be in South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait or near Taiwan Strait. That means their ships would come close to China. This is the only logical conclusion.

But then how helpful are these 8 submarines to Australia? I would argue that it actually gives them more trouble than pleasure. Why? Because Australia has no nuclear industry. And because of these eight nuclear summaries, they have to develop the industry from scratch, and these nuclear summaries have to be built elsewhere. Then, about nuclear submarines, the maintenance would be a big issue. No ships need to be maintained. And for nuclear submarines, these ships have to be sent somewhere for maintenance. So all these kind things would actually give them a lot of trouble. And besides, basically, I believe this kind of effort is because the Australia was sweet talked, therefore is actually subsidizing American military which doesn't have enough ships or manpower in this region.

Historic speaking, the irony is, Australia always fought other people's war, because they do not have wars of its own, be it Gallipoli, Vietnam or Afghanistan, they always fought others people’s war and they never think really hard about how to strike a balance. But now I think, strategically speaking, they would really feel the constant agony because they're just located in this region. And to see China growing ever stronger, I think a lot of people would think whether this right decision or not, to just gang up with United States so blindly, because this decision was made in a very rash manner, it's not fully consulted and a lot of people spoke against it, be it PM Paul Keating or PM Turnbull, they all talked against it.

The Spectator: So in relation to Taiwan then, because as you say, it is all about China and it is about the Taiwan Strait. How does AUKUS change China's calculations about what to do with Taiwan?

Zhou Bo: AUKUS would certainly complicated Beijing's decision making, but it's not a game changer. It's just as simple as that. Well, think of the eight nuclear power submarines. When could they be produced and when can they be deployed and when can they become operational? It is at least 10 years away. And in the beginning, people basically talk about the first submarine be deployed before 2040. Okay, even in 10 years' time, let me ask you, how strong would then PLA Navy become? Okay, let's talk about submarine. In terms of submarine, PLA has more submarines than even in the United States. Of course, there is a question of quality. And most of the submarines, they’re conventional submarine, but quantity has its own quality, numbers also matter. And Chinese ships are also being improved with quality tremendously. So in 10 years time, how strong would PLA Navy become? Then, how would these eight submarines really matter for us? As I said before, it may just complicate our decision making because we have to take them into account, but that is not a game change.

The Spectator: Zhou Bo, thank you so much.

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